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Using data from the British Household Panel Survey for 1991-99 and the German Socio-
Economic Panel for 1984-99, the authors investigate job mobility and estimate the returns to tenure
and experience. Job mobility was higher in the United Kingdom than in Germany. Returns to
experience also seem to have been substantially higher in the United Kingdom, where the wage
gain associated with ten years of labor market experience was around 80%, compared to 35% in
Germany. The low returns to labor market experience in Germany appear to have been accountable
to one group of workers: those with apprenticeship training, who tended to receive fairly high
starting wages but to experience relatively low wage growth thereafter. Wage growth due to labor
market experience was similar between the two countries for the other skill groups. Returns to
tenure were close to zero in both countries.
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1Our analysis considers West Germany only, but we 
sometimes refer to it as “Germany.”  Wage structures in 
East and West Germany are not comparable, in particular 
not in the first years after unification.
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  n this paper we analyze job mobility and   
  wage  growth  for  two  large  European 
economies that are possibly polar opposites 
in terms of their labor market institutions 
and regulations:  the United Kingdom and 
Germany.1  We focus our analysis on the rela-
tive magnitude of the effects of tenure in the 
firm and experience in the labor market on 
the wage growth of workers in the two coun-
tries.  Unlike most previous work, our analysis 
allows for different tenure and experience 
profiles for different education groups.  For 
our empirical analysis, we use two panel data 
sets, the British Household Panel Survey and 
the German Socio-Economic Panel.
While the impact of job seniority on wages 
has  generated  extensive  debate,  the  role 
of general labor market experience has at-
tracted less interest.  Job tenure and general 
experience are understood as measures of 
job-specific and general human capital, re-
spectively, and their association with wages 
is  often  interpreted  as  effects  of  specific 
and  general  human  capital  on  individual 
wage profiles.  Straightforward estimation 
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mechanisms that induce correlation between 
wages on the one hand and labor market ex-
perience and tenure on the other, as we will 
discuss below.  Various estimators have been 
suggested to address these problems (see, for 
example, Abraham and Farber 1987; Altonji 
and Shakotko 1987; Topel 1991; Altonji and 
Williams 1998; Williams 2004; Dustmann and 
Meghir 2005).
Our investigation of job mobility and wage 
growth  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Ger-
many addresses possible bias in the returns 
to experience and tenure due to individual 
and job match effects.  To allow for different 
human capital accumulation by skill group, 
we provide separate estimates for different 
qualification groups in the two countries.  In 
our discussion of the results we suggest two 
possible explanations for the differences we 
observe in terms of selection and mobility, 
and for how these may relate to differences 
in labor market and education institutions:   
“stickier  wages”  in  Germany  than  in  the 
United Kingdom (in models with employers’ 
learning  of  workers’  ability);  and  adverse 
selection of job movers in Germany due to 
low mobility in a context of asymmetric in-
formation between current and prospective 
employers about workers’ ability.
1. Labor Market and Training Institutions 
in the United Kingdom and Germany
Most investigations of returns to job tenure 
and labor market experience have been one-
country studies.  This paper, in contrast, in-
vestigates and compares job mobility and the 
determinants of wage growth in two countries 
with very different labor market institutions 
and patterns of job mobility:  Germany and 
the United Kingdom.  Institutional disparities 
may play an important role in facilitating or 
hampering wage flexibility and job mobility, 
as well as affect the way general and specific 
human capital relates to wage growth.  Com-
parison of these two countries is also inter-
esting in light of the current debates about 
labor market de-regulation and vocational 
training programs.  The relatively flexible 
U.K. labor market is often seen as a model 
for labor market reforms that have yet to be 
implemented in Germany and other Euro-
pean economies.  It is likely that differences 
in labor market institutions, regulations, and 
training systems have consequences for the 
way both job search and firm-specific and 
general human capital contribute to wage 
growth.  In this section we briefly explain some 
of the key differences; later, in Sections 5–6, 
we discuss implications of these differences 
for our analysis.2
According to the OECD Employment Outlook 
(1999), the United Kingdom is among the 
countries with the least restrictive employ-
ment protection legislation, while Germany, 
like France and some southern European 
countries, has relatively strict employment 
protection3 (see also Nickell 1997).  Dismiss-
als or redundancies in Germany are costly 
in  terms  of  time,  money,  and  procedural 
complexity (see Hunt 2000 for details on 
German dismissal policies).  Higher firing 
costs in Germany may lead to lower mobility 
and more screening, as it is more costly for 
firms to hire bad workers (see, for example, 
Kugler and Saint Paul 2000).  They may also 
reduce the importance of search for wage 
growth, which may affect the way returns to 
tenure and experience are biased in straight-
forward OLS regressions.  Finally, asymmetric 
information between current and prospective 
employers about workers’ ability may lead 
to more adverse selection when mobility is 
low (see Schoenberg 2004), eventuating in 
higher job attachment of more able workers 
in Germany, and more negative selection of 
job movers.
2One may wonder how German reunification, which 
took place in 1990, might have affected the estimates 
of returns to tenure and experience in West Germany.   
That would depend on the flows of labor between the 
two regions.  How these flows affect returns to skills 
depends on how migration changes the skill composition 
in the receiving region.  Recent studies investigating the 
impact of immigration influxes from Eastern Europe 
have failed to find any statistically significant effects on 
wages or relative wages of natives (see, for example, Bonin 
2005; Glitz 2006).  This negative evidence suggests that 
reunification is unlikely to have affected our results.
3The indicators of strictness of employment protec-
tion  used  are  based  on  the  regulations  concerning 
firing, such as redundancy procedures, mandated pre-
notification periods and severance payments, special 
requirements for collective dismissals, and short-time 
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Moreover, unlike the United Kingdom, 
Germany has a tight corporatist labor mar-
ket,  with  centralized  wage  negotiations.4   
Although  there  are  no  legal  minimum 
wages in Germany, and union membership is 
relatively low, union wage coverage affected 
about 76% of workers in the private sector 
in West Germany over the period 1996–99 
(see  Dustmann  and  Schoenberg  2004  for 
details).  In the United Kingdom over the 
years  1991–99,  wages  were  less  regulated, 
with collective bargaining coverage declining 
from 54% in 1990 to 36% in 1997 (Ochel 
2001) and no minimum wages for nearly the 
entire period.5  These differences can lead 
to differences in the returns to tenure and 
experience, since unions tend to be associated 
with reduced wage dispersion in general and 
lower returns to labor market experience in 
particular (Pereira 2002).
A further distinguishing feature is the way 
young workers are trained after secondary 
school  and  their  ensuing  transition  from 
secondary school to the labor market.  In the 
United Kingdom, post-secondary education 
is usually state-provided, through universities, 
colleges, and vocational schools.  Germany, 
on  the  other  hand,  operates  an  appren-
ticeship-based  training  system,  combining 
state-financed  academic  education  with 
firm-financed on-the-job training.  Training 
takes place in about 320 registered occupa-
tions, and lasts between two and three years.   
Successful graduates are certified as skilled 
workers.    This  system  trains  the  majority 
(about 65%) of the German work force.  It 
is well suited to providing the labor market 
with the skills needed, and, by creating strong 
links with the labor market already during the 
training period, it promotes a smooth transi-
tion into work from secondary school (see 
Ryan 2001 and Steedman; Gospel and Ryan 
1998).  As young workers who graduate after 
the training period are well trained in their 
chosen occupation and entitled to receive at 
least the minimum wage for skilled workers in 
that occupation and industry, they are likely 
to have higher initial wages than workers who 
enter the labor market through other chan-
nels, but lower wage growth through later 
learning.  Further, as training is occupation-
specific, it may reduce workers’ mobility.  Both 
of these dynamics may sufficiently affect the 
returns to tenure and experience to differ-
entiate Germany from the United Kingdom 
along those dimensions.  The particularities 
of this training system therefore call for a 




Our aim is to estimate the wage effects of 
general and firm-specific human capital.  We 
assume that workers obtain the full return to 
general human capital, but that they share 
some portion of the return to specific human 
capital with the employer.6  Let
(1)  lnHijt = g(Tijt) + f(Xijt) + mijt
be the part of human capital for which worker 
i in firm j is paid in period t, with g(Tijt) and 
4There are strong unions and employers’ associa-
tions with the power to conclude collective agreements 
on virtually all labor relations matters.  The Federal 
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs estimates that, in 
1990, the number of collective agreements in force was 
about 32,000, encompassing almost all industries and 
services and about 90% of all employees (Paqué 1993).   
Typically, these collective agreements fix contractual 
minima for wages and working conditions, and in prac-
tice virtually all organized employers offer the same 
wages and working conditions to union members and 
non-members alike.
5Wage councils were abolished in 1993.  They covered 
around 2.5 million employees in retailing, clothing, and 
hairdressing.  Their scope was reduced by the Wages Act 
1986, which exempted workers under 21 and restricted 
the Councils to setting a unique minimum hourly rate for 
all covered workers.  Minimum wages were re-introduced 
in the United Kingdom in April 1999, with a National 
Minimum Wage (see Metcalf 1999; Emire database).
6
See Becker (1993) for an illuminating discussion of 
an equilibrium in which employers share the return on 
specific human capital with employees.  See Hashimoto 
(1981), Harris and Felli (1996), and Scoones and Ber-
nhardt (1996) for equilibrium models exploring how 
returns are shared between employer and employee.   
Parent (2002) pointed out that finding no returns to 
firm tenure does not imply that firm-specific human 
capital is not important, and offered an approach for 
assessing the importance of firm-specific human capital 
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f(Xijt) being functions in tenure and labor 
market experience, and mijt a composite of 
individual- and job match–specific effects.   
Further, define the wage as wijt = Hijte
gt+uijt, 
where  gt  are  economy-wide  macro  shocks 
and uijt are transitory shocks and measure-
ment error.7
Assuming for expositional purposes that g 
and f are linear functions in experience and 
tenure (we will estimate higher-order poly-
nomials below), and taking logs, we obtain 
the wage equation
(2)  Wijt = gt + b1Xijt + b2Tijt + eijt,
where Wijt is the log of the gross real hourly 
wage of individual i in job j at time t, Xijt is 
actual experience in the labor market, and 
Tijt is seniority with the current employer.   
The key parameters of interest, b1 and b2, 
give the partial effects of an additional year 
of experience or tenure on the wage, condi-
tional on the three orthogonal components 
in the error term eijt = qij + Ai + uijt.  The indi-
vidual fixed effect Ai captures unmeasured 
differences in ability, the job match effect 
qij is fixed during the course of a job and al-
lows for heterogeneity in the quality of the 
job matches, and the transitory component 
uijt  accounts  for  idiosyncratic  shocks  and 
measurement error.
As Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel 
(1991) noted, if the unobserved individual 
and job match effects are correlated with ten-
ure, experience, or both, then least squares 
estimates of b1 and b2 are likely to be biased.   
To assess these biases, consider the following 
auxiliary regressions:
(3)  Ai = b1Xijt + b2Tijt + zijt;
  qij = c1Xijt + c2Tijt + yijt.
Therefore, in a cross-section of individu-
als, both the individual effects and the job 
match effects can be correlated with years 
of seniority and labor market experience.   
Least squares estimation of (2) is likely to 
produce biased estimates of returns to senior-
ity and experience, with b1
OLS – b1 = b1 + c1 and   
b 2
OLS – b2 = b2 + c2.
In order to assess the likely signs of these 
biases,  one  can  use  straightforward  parti-
tioned regression results applied to (3) to 
obtain explicit expressions for b1, b2, c1, and 
c2 in terms of the variances and covariances 




 Cov(Xijt, Ai) – gTXCov(Tijt, Ai)




 Cov(Tijt, Ai) – gXTCov(Xijt, Ai)




 Cov(Xijt, qij) – gTXCov(Tijt, qij)




 Cov(Tijt, qij) – gXTCov(Xijt, qij)
         Var(Tijt)[1 – rXT
2]
Here gTX is the coefficient from a regression 
of experience on tenure, gXT the coefficient 
from a regression of tenure on experience, 
and rXT the correlation coefficient between 
X and T.  It is clear from these expressions 
that a bias in estimating the returns to labor 
market experience affects the estimate of the 
return to tenure and vice-versa, as tenure and 
experience are correlated with each other.   
Unlike with the instrumental variables esti-
mators below, under plausible assumptions 
the least squares biases in experience and 
tenure due to both the individual fixed effect 
and the job match effects cannot be signed 
unambiguously.  (See Altonji and Shakotko 
1987, Altonji and Williams 2005, and Topel 
1991 for further discussion.)
Estimation
The estimators we use are the instrumental 
7A more flexible model was proposed by Dustmann 
and Meghir (2004).  They allowed for differences in 
career paths between individuals.  The quality of a match 
is reflected not only by the match-specific productivity, 
but also by the steepness of the career profile within a 
given firm.  They also allowed for individual-specific 
experience profiles.  Their more general model requires 
additional identifying information, which is not available 
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variable estimator suggested by Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987) and Finnie’s (1993) modifi-
cation of the Altonji and Shakotko estimator 
(see also Parent 1999, 2000; Marcotte 1998).   
In Altonji and Shakotko’s (1987) approach, 
each of the tenure variables is instrumented 
with its deviations from job means DTijt.  Let 
T
–
ij be the job mean of the tenure variable; 
then DTijt = Tijt – T
–
ij.  As this variable has zero 
mean within each job, it is by construction 
orthogonal to the fixed individual and job 
match components.8  Hereafter we will call the 
estimation method of instrumenting tenure 
with its deviations from job means IVten1.9
Applying IVten1 to (2) may still produce 
biased estimates of returns to seniority and ex-
perience.  Consider a variable T ˆ
ijt containing 
the predicted values of a regression of tenure 
on its deviations from job means.  The result-
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    –gXT ˆCov(Xijt, qij)
    Var(T ˆ
ijt)[1 – rXT ˆ
2]
A  positive  correlation  between  experi-
ence and the job match effect may impart 
an upward bias to the experience effect and 
a downward bias to the tenure effect.  Both 
biases may be reinforced by any remaining 
ability bias in the experience variable.
As  an  attempt  to  compare  the  relative 
importance of the individual and job het-
erogeneity bias in the two countries, in our 
empirical section we also use as an alternative 
instrumental variable for tenure its deviations 
from individual means (Finnie 1993).  We call 
this instrumental variable estimator IVten2.   
Intuitively, while IVten2 would represent an 
improvement over least squares since it pro-
duces an estimate of returns to tenure free 
from the bias due to the correlation between 
tenure and the individual fixed effect, IVten1 
produces an estimate of returns to tenure 
free from the bias due to the correlation be-
tween tenure and both the individual and job 
match effects.  A comparison of least squares, 
IVten1, and IVten2 could give an indication 
of the relative importance of individual and 
job match heterogeneity in the returns to 
tenure.  Indirectly, this could yield evidence 
of the relative importance in the two coun-
tries of the correlation between ability and 
job duration and between job match quality 
and job duration.  Such evidence is, however, 
not conclusive, as can be shown by compar-
ing the expressions of the remaining biases 
in the returns to tenure and experience for 
IVten1 above with the ones for IVten2 (avail-
able upon request).
To take account of the correlation between 
labor market experience and the individual 
effect, IVten1 can be extended by using as an 
instrument for experience its deviations from 
individual means,10 DExpijt = Expijt – Expi, where 
Expijt is the individual mean of the experience 
variables.  Extension to higher-order poly-
nomials is straightforward.  As this variable 
has zero average over each individual, it is 
by construction orthogonal to the individual 
fixed effect:  b 1
IVten exp = 0 and b 2
IVten exp = 0.  Ex-
perience instruments can still nevertheless 
be correlated with the job match component, 
leading to a positive bias in experience and 




     Cov(X ˆ
ijt, qij)
     Var(X ˆ




8In our empirical analysis we also include higher-
order terms in tenure that are instrumented in the 
same way.
9
Topel (1991) showed that this estimator is equivalent 
(at least for the linear case) to his two-step estimator, 
where macro effects are pre-estimated, and where (in 
his second step) experience is used as an instrument 
for experience at the start of a job.
10This instrument has been used by Finnie (1993) 




     –gX ˆ T ˆCov(X ˆ
ijt, qij)
    Var(T ˆ
ijt)[1 – rX ˆ T ˆ
2]
We  refer  to  the  instrumental  variables 
estimator that uses DExpijt as an additional 
instrument for experience as IVtenexp.  Both 
IVten1  and IVtenexp  give  upper  bounds  to 
returns to experience and lower bounds to 
returns to tenure.
A further problem in estimating equation 
(2) is the treatment of time effects, repre-
sented by gt.  Time may be correlated with 
job match effects or individual heterogeneity 
for various reasons, as discussed by Altonji 
and Williams (2005).  With that in mind, 
we instrumented time with the deviation of 
time from its mean within individuals in our 
regressions, but the resulting estimates were 
practically  identical  to  non-instrumented 
ones.  We therefore report results with non-
instrumented time dummies below.
3. Data
We use the first nine waves of the British 
Household Panel Survey (1991–99) and the 
first sixteen waves of the German Socio-Eco-
nomic Panel (1984–99).11  Below are brief 
descriptions of these data sets; further details 
are provided in the Appendix.
The British Household Panel Survey
The BHPS12 was designed as an annual 
survey of all adult (age 16+) members of a 
nationally  representative  sample  of  more 
than 5,000 households, generating a total of 
approximately 10,000 individual interviews.   
The same individuals are followed in succes-
sive waves.  In order to construct tenure and 
experience, we use the retrospective data on 
past jobs collected in the second and third 
waves (1992 and 1993).  For this reason, we 
may not be able to include some adults of 
newly formed households with members that 
split off from the original households.  We 
assume that this sample selection is random 
and does not affect the wage regressions as 
long as tenure and experience are included 
in the regressions.13
At each wave the interviewees are asked 
to state the beginning date of the ongoing 
job spell, which is defined by a change of 
employer or a change of job within the same 
employer.  We link this information collected 
at various waves to construct tenure with the 
employer.
When linking the job spell information 
in  the  various  yearly  questionnaires  and 
the retrospective data collected in waves 2 
and 3, one is confronted with overlapping 
information for the same spell.  Conflict-
ing answers are resolved by giving priority 
to the information collected closest to the 
event occurrence, in recognition of the fact 
that recall error is likely to increase with the 
time elapsed between an event and the time 
of the interview.
We restrict the sample to observations of 
non-self-employed white men aged between 
18 and 60 with jobs in the private sector.   
The earnings variable used is the real hourly 
wage, which is obtained by dividing real gross 
monthly pay in the current job by 4.33 times 
weekly hours worked, where weekly hours 
is the sum of the number of normal hours 
worked per week and the number of overtime 
hours.  Imputed wage values were discarded, 
along with 37 wage outliers.14
11The results we report in the tables refer to these two 
time windows.  We have also estimated models using the 
period between 1991 and 1999 for both countries; this 
changes the results only marginally, and does not affect 
the implications we draw from our analysis.
12We are grateful to the U.K. Data Archive at the 
University of Essex for providing us with the data.
13
The BHPS follows children of sampled families when 
they reach the age of 16.  If they leave their parents to 
create their own household, they continue to be surveyed.   
Additional members of these newly formed households 
also become part of the BHPS.  In our sample we are 
able to include young adults of original BHPS-sampled 
families, since we observe their complete labor market 
history.  However, we are not able to include additional 
members of these newly formed households if the age 
at which they entered the labor market differs from 
the age they started their current job.  This is because 
we are unable to construct actual experience for these 
individuals.  Sample selection bias could be present 
to the extent that higher-skilled individuals are more 
likely to form their own households and to live with 
other high-skilled individuals.  Our IV regressions may 
reduce some of that bias.
14
These include 17 observations with hourly wages 
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In  our  analysis  we  divide  workers  into 
three skill groups:  unskilled, medium-skilled, 
and university graduates.  For the U.K. data 
the unskilled include those who report the 
following qualifications:  no qualifications, 
other  qualifications,  apprenticeship,  CSE, 
commercial qualifications, no O levels.  The 
medium-skilled include those with O levels or 
equivalent, nursing qualifications, teaching 
qualifications, or A levels.  Finally, the univer-
sity graduates are those with a higher degree, 
a first degree, or other higher qualification.
The German Socio-Economic Panel
The GSOEP started in 1984 as a yearly 
longitudinal survey of 4,298 private house-
holds15 and around 9,000 individuals in West 
Germany.  Although data have also been col-
lected for former East Germany since 1990, we 
restrict our analysis to West Germany.  Similar 
to the BHPS, in the GSOEP all household 
members are interviewed individually from 
the age of 16.  Our sample is also constructed 
in a similar way:  only non-self-employed white 
men aged between 18 and 60 with jobs in the 
private sector are included.
The number of years of labor market ex-
perience was constructed in two stages.  In 
the first stage we use the yearly biographical 
scheme (included in the first wave, or the 
questionnaire  administered  to  every  new 
panel entrant) containing employment in-
formation from the age of 16 to construct 
total experience at the entry of the panel.   
Both part-time and full-time spells are con-
sidered.    In  the  second  stage  we  use  the 
calendar available for each wave, listing all 
labor market activities for each month in the 
year preceding the interview.  This informa-
tion is added to the information computed 
in the first stage to construct experience at 
each wave.  The tenure variable is constructed 
from the information about the exact year 
and month the individual has started the 
current job (that is, the employment spell 
with the current employer), up to the time 
of the interview.  Wages are computed by di-
viding reported gross earnings in the month 
before the interview by the number of hours 
worked for pay.16
The  three  skill  groups  considered  are 
workers with no post-secondary education 
(unskilled),  workers  with  post-secondary 
apprenticeship  training  but  no  university 
education (medium-skilled), and workers with a 
wage decline of 85% between two consecutive years, and 
14 observations with a within-job hourly wage growth 
larger than 500% between two consecutive years.
15These numbers are for GSOEP subsample A—“Resi-
dents in the FRG,” 95% scientific-use version.  See the 
excellent documentation by Haisken-DeNew and Frick 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics— 
Mean Sample Characteristics for White Men.
  U.K.—  Germany— 
Variable  BHPS  GSOEP
Log Real Hourly Wage  1.78  2.93
  (0.43)  (0.36)
Hours Worked per Week  39.8  43.09
  (6.7)  (6.7)
Age  36.87  39.28
  (10.88)  (10.72)
Tenure (years)  8.2  11.9
  (7.9)  (10.1)
Experience (years)  19.6  19.2
  (11.6)  (11.7)
Percent Married  63.8  69.8
Percent Unskilled  26.09  10.6
Percent Medium-Skilled/ 
  Apprenticeship Training  63.64  78.0
Percent University Graduates  10.28  11.45
Number of Observations  7,073  16,318
Number of Individuals  1,502  2,729
Number of Jobs  2,259  3,827
Number of Waves  9  16
Note:    Standard  deviations  in  parentheses.    U.K. 
wages are in British pounds and German wages are in 
Deutschmarks.
2003 and SOEP-Group 2001 for more details on the 
data.  The data used in this publication were made 
available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW), Berlin.
16
We use monthly gross earnings.  Our wage measure 
does not include additional yearly payments in the form 
of holiday or Christmas money, a type of bonus that is 
not uncommon in Germany.  To check robustness with 
respect to the inclusion of these remunerations, we 
have re-estimated the models below including these 
additional payments.  The results, which are included 
in an appendix that is available on request, hardly differ 
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university degree (university graduates).  (See 
the Appendix for more details.)
Finally, we stress that in both data sets, 
wage  information  refers  unequivocally  to 
the current main job, employer changes are 
identified, and tenure information is based 
on monthly calendar information (GSOEP) 
or the exact start date (BHPS).  These proce-
dures avoid problems noted in some of the 
work on tenure effects based on the PSID data 
(see Altonji and Shakatko 1987; Topel 1992; 
Altonji and Williams 1998).  While tenure 
and experience measures in the PSID can be 
dated to the interview date, wage information 
is based on annual earnings, thus creating 
error in the exact allocation of tenure and 
experience to a particular wage spell (see 
Altonji and Williams 2005 for a discussion).   
This problem is aggravated by the fact that 
the PSID does not identify employers, so that 
employer changes are inferred from calendar 
time and tenure (see Brown and Light 1992 
for a detailed discussion).
4. Descriptive Statistics
The Sample
In Table 1 we show the mean characteristics 
for the two samples.  The two data sets are he two data sets are 
very similar. The average age was 37 in the  similar.  The average age was 37 in the 
United Kingdom and 39 in Germany; mean 
experience, 19.6 years in the United Kingdom 
and 19.2 years in Germany.  When construct-
ing labor market experience in Germany, we 
did not include the apprenticeship training 
period; hence the larger age-experience gap 
in Germany than in the United Kingdom.   
Average tenure was two years longer in Ger-
many than in the United Kingdom.
Wage Growth:   Total,  
within Jobs, and between Jobs
Figure 1 illustrates the average yearly wage 
growth in both countries over the observa-
tion window.17  Wage growth between two 
adjacent years is computed by averaging the 
difference in the log of the real hourly wage 
for all individuals observed in both periods.   
This does not necessarily coincide with total 
wage growth across all individuals, since it 
does not include those who entered and ex-
ited the panel.18  In the years 1984–99, real 
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17
Nominal wages were deflated with the retail price 
index for each country.  All figures and tables use real 
wages.
18
Wage growth between 1984 and 1985 in Germany 
may be understated, since, unlike in the other years, 
when 80–95% of interviews took place between Febru-382  INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
gross hourly wages in the German sample 
grew on average 2.71% per year, and in the 
period 1991–99 real gross hourly wages in 
the United Kingdom sample grew on average 
2.91% per year.  During the years for which 
there are data for the two countries—1991 to 
1999—the yearly wage growth was somewhat 
lower in Germany (2.11%, versus 2.91% in 
the United Kingdom).
Figure 2 plots within-job and between-job 
wage growth by 5-year experience intervals.   
In both countries, between-job wage growth 
(9.8% and 9.9% for Germany and the United 
Kingdom,  respectively)  was  higher  than 
within-job wage growth (4.1% and 6.6%) in 
the first 10 years of workers’ careers.  After 
that, wage gains at job changes fell below 
within-job wage growth.  This is consistent 
with  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  job 
search, and similar to what is reported for 
the United States (see, for example, Topel 
and Ward 1992).19
Figure 3 shows the number of jobs held by 
labor market experience.20  British workers 
held on average 4 jobs during the first 10 
years in the labor market, increasing to 5 jobs 
during the first 20 years; German workers, 
2.7 jobs (first 10 years) and 3 jobs (first 10 
years).  Mobility was therefore clearly higher 
in the United Kingdom.  However, in both 
countries the number of jobs held was small 
in comparison with the United States, where, 
during about the same period, workers held 
on average 6.96 jobs during the first ten years 
of  labor  market  experience21  (Topel  and 
Ward 1992:448).
Figure 4 graphs the percentage of job-to-
job transitions and job transitions with an 
unemployment  spell  between  jobs  on  the 
total number of individuals observed in paid 
employment in two consecutive waves by 5-
year experience interval.  Unemployment 
ary and April, in 1984 only 50% of the interviews had 
taken place by May, and the remaining were conducted 
between May and September.  Measurement error in 
yearly  wage  growth  is  therefore  likely  to  be  higher 
between 1984 and 1985 than in the other periods.  We 
expect the time dummies in our regression analysis to 
pick up the potential bias.
19The  negative  wage  growth  toward  the  end  of 
individuals’ careers is not significantly different from 
zero.  At high experience levels the data become very 
sparse and standard errors very large.  For example, 
for the United Kingdom, at 25–30 years of experience, 
there are 58 observations; wage growth is –0.05, with a 
standard error of 0.31.






















































20Due to the relatively smaller number of observations 
in the United Kingdom, in Figure 3 we apply a 3-year 
moving average to the variable “number of jobs.”
21It is important to note that Topel and Ward (1992) 
assumed that a full-time work spell occurs when an in-
dividual earns at least 70% of the minimum quarterly 
wage during that quarter across all jobs.  In both the 
U.K. and German data, a work spell is defined as occur-
ring when an individual reports that employment—as 
opposed to, for example, schooling—was his or her 
main activity.  Student summer jobs may therefore be 
more likely to be excluded from the U.K. and German 
data than from similar U.S. surveys, and if so, one result 
could be a slight overstatement of the difference between 
the United States and the two European countries in 
the average number of jobs during the first 10 years of 
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is defined differently in the two data sets.   
Whereas in the United Kingdom individuals 
reported their own assessment of their labor 
market status, in Germany they were asked 
whether they were registered as unemployed.   
Because of this disparity, the figures also show 
the percentage of job-to-job transitions with 
an intermediate non-labor-market spell.  The 
difference between the share of transitions 
with unemployment and the share of transi-
tions with a non-labor-market spell was larger 
for Germany than for the United Kingdom.   
This is consistent with a more stringent defi-
nition of unemployment status in the Ger-
man data.  In both countries both job-to-job 
transitions and transitions with interruptions 
declined with time in the labor market.  This 
is consistent with decreasing marginal returns 
from search.  These graphs are consistent 
with higher job mobility in the United King-
dom than in Germany, since the occurrence 
of both types of transitions is higher in the 
former for all experience categories.  How-
ever, the two countries differ much more 
in the occurrence of job-to-job transitions 
than in transitions with a non-employment 
spell.  This is suggestive of a stronger role 
for voluntary job changes and search in the 
United Kingdom than in Germany.
5. Estimating Returns to  
Experience and Tenure
Table 2 shows the cumulative returns to 
tenure and experience in the two countries 
using the four estimation methods described:   
OLS,  IVten1,  IVten2,  and  IVtenexp.22    All 
regressions use fourth degree polynomials 
in tenure and experience to allow for non-
linear returns.
Columns  (1)  and  (5)  of  Table  2  show 
that, according to OLS estimates, ten years 
of tenure were associated with an 8.8% wage 
increase in the United Kingdom and a 12.8% 
wage  increase  in  Germany.    Interestingly, 
these values are considerably smaller than 
typical estimates based on U.S. data, which 
indicate that ten years of tenure increase 
wages by 25% (Altonji and Shakatko 1987) 
and 30% (Topel 1991).
In columns (2) and (6) we present the 
results  of  estimations  in  which  tenure  is 
instrumented with its deviations from job 
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Figure 3. Number of Jobs by Experience, United Kingdom and Germany.
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Coefficient estimates are available on request to 
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means (IVten1).  The returns to 10 years of 
tenure decline to 5.4% in the United King-
dom and to zero in Germany.  This suggests 
that  the  correlation  between  tenure  and 
the individual and job match effects gener-
ates a positive bias in the returns to tenure 
estimated by OLS.  Taken at face value, the 
difference between the least squares and the 
IVten1 estimates of the tenure effect suggests 
that this bias is larger in Germany than in the 
United Kingdom.
In  columns  (3)  and  (7)  we  present 
results  from  estimations  instrumenting 
tenure with deviations from the individual 
means (IVten2).  Recall that this estimator 
eliminates  only  the  correlation  between 
tenure and the effect of individual-specific 
productivity, not the correlation with the 
match-specific effect.  For the United King-
dom, these coefficient estimates for tenure 
are very similar to the ones using OLS (as 
are experience coefficients).  Since IVten1 
produces an estimate of returns to tenure 
free from the bias due to the correlation 
between tenure and both the individual and 
job match effects, this would be consistent 
with individual heterogeneity bias having 
only minor importance in the United King-
dom.  Lower IVten1 than IVten2 estimates of 
the tenure effect suggest that least squares 
is positively biased mainly due to job match 
heterogeneity.  However, as we discussed 
above, the differences between these esti-
mates can only be interpreted as suggestive 
of such an interpretation.
In Germany, the tenure effects obtained 
from IVten2 are lower than those from least 
squares estimation, and higher than those 
from IVten1.  Returns to experience estimated 
with IVten2 are higher than those estimated 
with  least  squares  and  slightly  lower  than 
those estimated with IVten1.  These results 
are consistent with least squares returns to 
tenure being positively biased due to both 
individual and job match heterogeneity.
The evidence provided by the differences 
between  least  squares,  IVten1,  and  IVten2 
estimates is suggestive of more able workers 
having longer job durations in Germany, and 
of jobs with better matches lasting longer in 
the United Kingdom.  This underscores the 
importance of search in the United Kingdom, 
where an upward bias in the tenure coef-
ficient seems to be driven largely by good 
matches being more likely to survive.  This 
could help explain some of the difference in 
mobility patterns between the two countries.   
The considerably larger percentage of early 
job-to-job transitions in the United Kingdom 
described earlier is consistent with more fre-
quent voluntary job changes resulting from 
higher gains from search.
As we pointed out above, because experi-
ence may be correlated with the individual 
and job error components, returns to expe-
rience are likely to be biased, which may in 
turn bias returns to tenure.  Columns (4) and 
(8) show that when both tenure and experi-
ence are instrumented (IVtenexp), returns 
to tenure in both countries are close to zero 
Figure 4. Types of Transition Between Two Waves in Employment, United Kingdom and Germany.
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Table 2.  Cumulative Returns to Tenure and Experience—OLS and IV.
  United Kingdom  Germany
  OLS  IVten1  IVten2  IVtenexp  OLS  IVten1  IVten2  IVtenexp
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
1 Year Tenure  0.0106  0.0118  0.0113  0.0131  0.0165  0.0041  0.0103  0.0042
  (0.0046)*  (0.0091)  (0.0072)  (0.0089)  (0.0025)**  (0.0039)  (0.0032)**  (0.0039)
5 Years Tenure  0.0485  0.0416  0.0487  0.0418  0.0733  0.0097  0.0383  0.0113
  (0.0146)**  (0.0284)  (0.0213)*  (0.0264)  (0.0083)**  (0.0133)  (0.0107)**  (0.0132)
10 Years Tenure  0.0880  0.0543  0.0860  0.0445  0.1276  –0.0037  0.0483  0.0005
  (0.0165)**  (0.0363)  (0.0247)**  (0.0292)  (0.0100)**  (0.0181)  (0.0134)**  (0.0173)
15 Years Tenure  0.1218  0.0574  0.1218  0.0363  0.1701  –0.0335  0.0383  –0.0283
  (0.0163)**  (0.0472)  (0.0295)**  (0.0341)  (0.0100)**  (0.0232)  (0.0155)*  (0.0208)
1 Year Exp.  0.0982  0.1008  0.0985  0.0915  0.0428  0.0439  0.0428  0.0458
  (0.0062)**  (0.0071)**  (0.0066)**  (0.0131)**  (0.0033)**  (0.0036)**  (0.0035)**  (0.0048)**
5 Years Exp.  0.4612  0.4766  0.4630  0.4452  0.1851  0.1992  0.1912  0.2038
  (0.0303)**  (0.0352)**  (0.0321)**  (0.0633)**  (0.0130)**  (0.0145)**  (0.0137)**  (0.0193)**
10 Years Exp.  0.7866  0.8209  0.7900  0.8090  0.2972  0.3473  0.3254  0.3434
  (0.0494)**  (0.0596)**  (0.0528)**  (0.1103)**  (0.0178)**  (0.0209)**  (0.0192)**  (0.0284)**
15 Years Exp.  0.9509  1.0029  0.9544  1.0514  0.3499  0.4535  0.4127  0.4316
  (0.0549)**  (0.0703)**  (0.0595)**  (0.1402)**  (0.0181)**  (0.0242)**  (0.0206)**  (0.0323)**
20 Years Exp.  1.0010  1.0682  1.0029  1.1837  0.3644  0.5318  0.4688  0.4905
  (0.0536)**  (0.0745)**  (0.0593)**  (0.1620)**  (0.0173)**  (0.0293)**  (0.0219)**  (0.0359)**
F-Stat. (Tenure)  23.8  5.5  0.7  0.7  163.4  3.3  5.4  5.3
F-Stat. (Experience)  193.6  146.0  111.3  28.3  171.7  156.4  182.4  68.8
Observations  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318
R2  0.3012  0.2880  0.2985  0.0226  0.3917  0.3127  0.3585  0.2874
Note:  Log-wage returns to k years of tenure (experience) with k = 1,5,10,15,20 is the cross-product of the row vector of the tenure 
(experience) polynomial coefficients with a column vector of the form (k, k2, k3, k4).  Values presented are the wage returns and are 
obtained by applying an exponential transformation to the log wage returns minus 1.  Standard errors are the square root of a 1st-
order Taylor approximation of the corresponding variance.
IVten1:  tenure instrumented with its deviations from job means.
IVten2:  tenure instrumented with its deviations from individual means.
IVtenexp:  tenure instrumented with its deviations from job means and experience instrumented with its deviations from indi-
vidual means.
and not statistically significant.  Returns to 
experience  hardly  change  in  comparison 
with IVten1, but standard errors are higher.   
Remember that both IVten1 and IVtenexp give 
upper bounds to returns to experience and 
lower bounds to returns to tenure.
In the lower panel of Table 2 we report 
the estimated returns to labor market expe-
rience.  Overall, estimates across the four 
estimation methods point to higher returns 
to experience in the United Kingdom than 
in Germany.23  Estimates using OLS and in-
strumental variables are not very different.   
IVtenexp estimates for the United Kingdom 
show that the first year in the labor market 
yielded a return of about 9%, and by the 
10th year in the labor market the resulting 
average cumulative return was roughly 80%.   
The marginal returns decreased with experi-
ence, and the following 10 years generated 
an additional wage gain of about 25%.  In 
Germany, estimates from IVtenexp indicate 
wage gains of 4.6%, 34%, and roughly 50% 
associated with the first year in the labor 
market, the first 10 years, and the first 20 
years, respectively.
23
When computing years of experience in Germany, 
we did not include the apprenticeship period, since 
workers’ wages are institutionally set during their ap-
prenticeship training.  If we added those years to the 
experience variable, the returns to the first 2–3 years 
in the labor market would be identified from the poly-
nomial function in experience for apprentices, since it 
would be inappropriate to use the wage data.  Regres-
sion results show that returns to tenure would remain 
essentially unchanged and returns to experience would 
increase, but would still be considerably lower than in 
the United Kingdom.  These results are available on 
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These  differences  in  returns  are  quite 
substantial.  One possible explanation is that 
centralized wage negotiations in Germany 
result in wage growth that is based more on 
the economy-wide time trend than on indi-
vidual experience profiles.  We investigate 
this possibility below.  Another reason may 
be that part of the general human capital 
that  is  acquired  in  the  United  Kingdom 
in the early years after labor market entry 
is  acquired  in  Germany  before  entering 
the labor market, resulting in higher entry 
wages but lower wage growth with respect to 
experience.  The large initial wage growth 
in the United Kingdom, paired with higher 
mobility, is suggestive of large increases in 
productivity at the start of a career, through 
both human capital accumulation and search.   
This explanation is quite plausible since, as 
we  discuss  in  the  introduction,  Germany 
operates an apprenticeship system providing 
post-secondary education for about 65% of its 
work force, which trains workers on the job 
(4 days a week) and in state-run schools (1 
Table 3.  Cumulative Returns to Tenure and Experience by Qualification.
    Unskilled      Medium-Qualified      University Graduates
  OLS  IVten1  IVtenexp  OLS  IVten1  IVtenexp  OLS  IVten1  IVtenexp
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
A.  United Kingdom
1 Year Tenure  0.0136  0.0198  0.0190  0.0137  0.0111  0.0109  –0.0203  –0.0075  0.0214
  (0.0089)  (0.0203)  (0.0183)  (0.0062)*  (0.0116)  (0.0112)  (0.0212)  (0.0354)  (0.0332)
10 Years Tenure  0.0869  0.0563  0.0397  0.0934  0.0653  0.0474  0.0663  –0.0445  0.0364
  (0.0336)** (0.0914)  (0.0613)  (0.0204)** (0.0479)  (0.0367)  (0.0493)  (0.1199)  (0.0853)
15 Years Tenure  0.1137  0.0255  –0.0015  0.1242  0.0801  0.0513  0.1362  –0.0315  0.0560
  (0.0322)** (0.1147)  (0.0713)  (0.0202)** (0.0632)  (0.0426)  (0.0592)*  (0.1572)  (0.1201)
1 Year Exp.  0.0802  0.0818  0.0777  0.0977  0.0966  0.0939  0.1627  0.1738  0.0903
  (0.0165)** (0.0191)** (0.0331)*  (0.0077)** (0.0087)** (0.0159)**  (0.0243)** (0.0300)** (0.0478)
10 Years Exp.  0.5938  0.6415  0.6749  0.8074  0.8171  0.8674  1.0477  1.1665  0.6531
  (0.1171)** (0.1516)** (0.2562)**  (0.0613)** (0.0731)** (0.1397)**  (0.1423)** (0.2087)** (0.2729)*
20 Years Exp.  0.7164  0.8264  1.0085  0.9995  1.1163  1.3064  1.0441  1.2457  0.7023
  (0.1170)** (0.1896)** (0.3232)**  (0.0645)** (0.0944)** (0.2104)**  (0.1223)** (0.2237)** (0.3084)*
Observations  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073  7,073
R2  0.3314  0.3065  0.2987  0.3314  0.3065  0.2987  0.3314  0.3065  0.2987
B.  Germany
1 Year Tenure  0.0041  –0.0110  –0.0142  0.0153  0.0030  0.0040  0.0210  0.0135  0.0051
  (0.0073)  (0.0130)  (0.0130)  (0.0028)** (0.0044)  (0.0044)  (0.0085)*  (0.0134)  (0.0125)
10 Years Tenure  0.0613  –0.0422  –0.0604  0.1256  –0.0092  0.0030  0.1423  0.0121  –0.0219
  (0.0296)*  (0.0650)  (0.0523)  (0.0113)** (0.0202)  (0.0192)  (0.0312)** (0.0626)  (0.0575)
15 Years Tenure  0.1020  –0.0544  –0.0707  0.1704  –0.0387  –0.0216  0.1777  –0.0317  –0.0758
  (0.0308)** (0.0853)  (0.0579)  (0.0112)** (0.0260)  (0.0229)  (0.0320)** (0.1151)  (0.0894)
1 Year Exp.  0.0860  0.0839  0.0879  0.0377  0.0399  0.0389  0.0478  0.0546  0.0797
  (0.0106)** (0.0123)** (0.0182)**  (0.0037)** (0.0041)** (0.0052)**  (0.0111)** (0.0134)** (0.0171)**
10 Years Exp.  0.5207  0.5503  0.6226  0.2591  0.3148  0.2876  0.3944  0.4573  0.6264
  (0.0634)** (0.0754)** (0.1239)**  (0.0193)** (0.0229)** (0.0294)**  (0.0604)** (0.0771)** (0.1113)**
20 Years Exp.  0.5138  0.6533  0.7427  0.3192  0.4867  0.4126  0.5532  0.7651  0.9403
  (0.0578)** (0.1103)** (0.1371)**  (0.0186)** (0.0324)** (0.0368)**  (0.0600)** (0.1675)** (0.1778)**
Observations  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318  16,318
R2   0.3950  0.3797  0.3118  0.3950  0.3797  0.3118  0.3950  0.3797  0.3118
Note:  Log-wage returns to k years of tenure (experience) with k = 1,5,10,15,20 is the cross-product of the row vector of the tenure 
(experience) polynomial coefficients with a column vector of the form (k, k2, k3, k4).  Values presented are the wage returns and are 
obtained by applying an exponential transformation to the log wage returns minus 1.  Standard errors are the square root of a 1st-
order Taylor approximation of the corresponding variance.
IVten1:  tenure instrumented with its deviations from job means.
IVtenexp:  tenure instrumented with its deviations from job means and experience instrumented with its deviations from indi-
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day a week) for a period of between two and 
three years.  If this training system is mainly 
responsible for the observed differences in 
estimates, then we should see more similar-
ity for workers at the low and high ends of 
the skill distribution between Germany and 
the United Kingdom.  To test this, we repeat 
our analysis, distinguishing between three 
different skill groups.
Cumulative Returns to Tenure  
and Experience by Skill Group
Table  3  displays  the  returns  to  tenure 
and experience by qualification group for 
the United Kingdom and Germany.24  The 
results shown in the table were obtained by 
interacting  qualification  dummies  for  the 
medium-skilled and university graduates with 
the tenure and experience polynomials.  Re-
sults are shown for OLS, IVten1, and IVtenexp.   
The  various  estimation  methods  differ  in 
roughly the same way for each qualification 
group as for the whole sample of workers.   
For both countries and all skill groups, IVten1 
estimates show lower tenure effects than least 
squares, though IVten1 estimates are in most 
cases not significantly different from zero.  In 
addition, in most cases IVten1 offers a higher 
lower bound to the returns to tenure and a 
lower upper bound to the returns to experi-
ence than IVtenexp (the exceptions are the 
university graduates in the United Kingdom 
and workers with apprenticeship training in 
Germany).  However, none of the returns to 
tenure estimates are significantly different 
from zero.
In  the  United  Kingdom,  according  to 
the IVtenexp estimates, returns to 10 years 
of experience were 67% for the unskilled, 
87%  for  workers  with  medium  skills,  and 
approximately  65%  for  university  gradu-
ates.  Thus, returns were largest for workers 
in the intermediate category.  In Germany, 
in contrast, intermediate-category workers 
received the smallest returns:  for workers 
who went through apprenticeship training, 
returns to ten years of experience estimated 
by IVtenexp were 29%, with an increase of only 
4% during the first year, while the estimate 
for the unskilled is 62%, with an increase of 
about 9% during the first year.  Returns for 
university graduates were similar to those for 
the unskilled.
Figure 5 shows IVtenexp estimates of wage 
growth with experience for unskilled workers 
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and workers with apprenticeship training in 
Germany.  Returns to tenure are not included, 
since  these  are  not  significantly  different 
from zero.  Entry wages were 35% higher for 
apprenticeship trainees.  However, as experi-
ence wage returns were considerably higher 
for non-apprentices, the gap rapidly closed 
over the first 10 years.  In fact, after 3 years of 
experience the difference in the wage returns 
between the two groups of workers was no 
longer significant at the 10% level.25
Comparing the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, for both the unskilled and university 
graduates, estimates of returns to experience 
are not very dissimilar.  According to IVtenexp 
point estimates, the unskilled seem to have 
enjoyed  somewhat  higher  returns  in  the 
United Kingdom than in Germany, especially 
in the second decade of their careers, and 
university  graduates  had  somewhat  lower 
returns in the United Kingdom.  However, 
given the large magnitude of the standard er-
rors, these differences are rather speculative.   
The difference in returns to labor market 
experience between the two countries seems 
to have been driven mainly by workers in the 
intermediate education category.
Estimation of Macro Trends
The model in equation (2) allows for three 
distinct sources of wage growth:  the partial 
effects of experience and tenure, the partial 
effect of match quality, and the partial effect 
of the macro trend, always holding individual 
ability constant.  Studies that consider one 
country  usually  do  not  report  the  macro 
trend in wages.  However, this is in itself an 
interesting  variable  when  different  labor 
markets are being compared.  In Figure 6, 
we display estimates of macro effects for the 
two countries.  These are coefficients of time 
dummies (in which the first year is omitted) 
based on simple OLS estimation.  Using the 
other  estimators  or  instrumental  variable 
estimators  yields  very  similar  coefficients 
(see the discussion in Section 1).  We have 
normalized the German series so that real 
wages are zero in 1991, the first year in which 
both countries are observed.





























Figure 6. Macro Effects Estimated by OLS United Kingdom and Germany.
Year
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
25Standard errors are computed as the square root of 
a 1st-order Taylor approximation of the corresponding 
variance.  For the unskilled, the variance is calculated 
by pre-multiplying and post-multiplying the variance 
covariance matrix of the coefficients of the experience 
polynomial by a matrix with the values of the experience 
terms.  For the apprenticeship trainees the variance-
covariance matrix also includes the coefficient on the 
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Over the early period 1991–96, aggregate 
wage growth was higher in Germany than in 
the United Kingdom, but toward the end of 
the decade the United Kingdom caught up, 
and by the end of the decade the contribu-
tion of aggregate growth to real wage growth 
was about 5.3% in the United Kingdom and 
5.8% in Germany.  These trends clearly il-
lustrate the strong economic expansion in 
the  United  Kingdom  after  1996  and  the 
economic stagnation in Germany in the late 
1990s.  On average, the yearly contribution of 
the economy-wide time trend to wage growth 
in 1991–99 was about 0.66% for the United 
Kingdom and 0.73% for Germany.
To investigate whether the macro trend 
affected all education and experience groups 
alike, we have estimated log wage regressions, 
in which we interacted a linear year trend 
with educational dummies as well as with the 
level of experience.  In Germany, we find that 
the macro trend contributed more to wage 
growth for the unskilled (on average, 1.9% 
per year over the entire observation window) 
than for the apprenticeship trainees and the 
university graduates (on average, 1.5% per 
year).  This is not unexpected, as union wages 
should mainly affect the wage structure at 
the lower end of the skill distribution.  When 
the linear trend interactions with the educa-
tional dummies are included, the coefficient 
of the interaction between experience and 
the year trend is virtually zero, suggesting 
that macro effects are similarly distributed 
across the experience distribution.  For the 
United  Kingdom,  a  fairly  similar  picture 
emerges, with the effect of the time trend on 
wage growth being 0.9% for the unskilled, 
0.7% for workers with medium skills, and not 
statistically different from zero for university 
graduates.  Again, the interaction between 
experience and the year trend is zero.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Average returns to labor market experi-
ence during the years we examined were, 
according to our results, markedly higher 
in the United Kingdom than in Germany.   
The estimates by skill group suggest that at 
least some of this difference is likely to have 
been due to higher “entry wages” for workers 
who had undergone apprenticeship training, 
since the returns to experience estimates are 
substantially lower for this group of workers 
than for the other two groups.26  Workers who 
undergo apprenticeship training in Germany 
are known to receive general or transferable 
skills (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999), 
and their productivity and corresponding 
wage may increase less after full-time labor 
market entry, simply because much of the 
learning is concentrated during the appren-
ticeship period.  In fact, for all other qualifica-
tion groups in Germany and all qualification 
groups in the United Kingdom, returns to 
experience had a much steeper slope dur-
ing the first few years.  Estimated returns to 
experience among unskilled workers seem to 
be somewhat lower in Germany than in the 
United Kingdom, and the opposite seems to 
be the case for university graduates.  However, 
given the magnitude of the standard errors, 
we cannot reject the possibility that these 
two groups of workers had similar returns 
to experience in the two countries.
Our estimates point to low average returns 
to tenure in both countries.  These estimates 
imply either that the component of workers’ 
skills that is not transferable across employ-
ers is unimportant, or that workers do not 
share with employers the return to job-spe-
cific human capital in the form of higher 
wages.  Our estimates may, however, still be 
downward-biased, as we could not correct for 
the potential upward bias in the experience 
effect.  There is some evidence that this is a 
potential problem.  Dustmann and Meghir 
(2005)  used  information  on  firm  closure 
from administrative data to eliminate this 
potential downward bias; they found that a 
model with this refinement yielded higher 
estimates of returns to tenure and lower esti-
mates of returns to experience.  Finally, it is 
interesting to note that our OLS estimates for 
tenure are much lower for both the United 
Kingdom and Germany than similar OLS 
26Even though the qualification groups are defined 
differently in the two countries, it is interesting to note 
that in Germany entry wages were 35% higher for appren-
ticeship trainees than for unskilled workers, while in the 
United Kingdom medium-qualified workers’ entry wages 
were only 13% higher than those of the unskilled.390  INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
estimates that have been reported for the 
United States.
Our  exploration  of  the  differences  be-
tween  OLS  and  IV  results  has  provided 
tentative  evidence  consistent  with  “more 
able” workers having longer job durations 
than  “less  able”  workers  in  Germany,  but 
not in the United Kingdom.  There are two 
possible explanations for why “more able” 
workers experience longer job tenures in 
Germany or, in other words, why “less able” 
workers are laid off more often or have more 
incentives to quit.
One possible source of negative selection 
of job movers is the presence of “sticky wages” 
(Gibbons and Katz 1991:376).  In a context 
of learning with sticky wages, where in a first 
stage the employer’s information about work-
ers’ ability is imperfect, the firm may be led 
to lay off workers whose productivity turns 
out to be “too low.”27  An assumption behind 
this model is that both current employers 
and prospective employers learn about the 
worker’s ability after a job spell.  Our discus-
sion in Section 1 suggests that it is likely that 
individual real wages of German workers are 
“stickier” than those of British workers.  Brit-
ish employers are likely to have more discre-
tion with respect to individual wage increases 
and  promotions  than  German  employers, 
who face wage tariffs for different occupations 
and industries as well as for worker-specific 
characteristics.28  This would imply that in 
Germany less able workers would be laid off 
more often than other workers but would 
not have more incentives to quit.29
An alternative possible source of negative 
selection of job movers is asymmetric infor-
mation between the current and prospective 
employers about workers’ ability.  Schönberg 
(2004) suggested that asymmetric informa-
tion may result in an ability bias in the estima-
tion of returns to job tenure.  In the context 
of asymmetric information, adverse selection 
is less important the higher the job mobil-
ity (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), reducing 
the expected difference in average ability 
between job stayers and job movers.  Since 
overall job mobility is higher in the United 
Kingdom than in Germany, adverse selection 
would support higher job attachment of more 
able workers in Germany than in the United 
Kingdom.  As pointed out by Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998:114), an implication of this 
would be “a worse allocation of workers to 
jobs” in Germany, since workers would “end 
up staying in jobs for which they have high 
disutility.”
Our paper suggests many similarities, but 
also significant differences, between the U.K. 
and  German  labor  markets.    Surprisingly 
little comparative work exists so far study-
ing either the mechanisms that drive wage 
growth  and  mobility  across  the  different 
European economies or differences between 
European economies and the economies of 
other industrialized countries.  Our paper 
suggests that institutional differences not only 
may lead to different underlying structural 
parameters, but also may affect the way and 
the extent to which coefficients retrieved by 
simple regression analysis are confounded 
with selection and search.
27See Dustmann and Schönberg (2004) for a model 
in which the presence of union wages leads firms to lay 
off workers with productivity below the union wage, once 
workers’ ability is revealed.  Their model’s main aim is 
to explain why firms pay for general training within the 
German Apprenticeship System.
28Indirect evidence of this is the fact that both the 
90-50 and the 50-10 percentile male wage differentials 
are larger in the United Kingdom than in Germany (see, 
for example, Blau and Kahn 1996).
29Distinguishing between workers in firms that do 
and do not recognize union agreements, Dustmann 
and Schoenberg (2007) found evidence of higher lay-off 
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30Question text:  “What was the date you started working in your present position?  If you have been promoted 
or changed grades, please give me the date of that change.  Otherwise please give me the date when you started 
doing the job you are doing now for your present employer.”
31Self-employment spells are also included in experience, even though they do not make much difference, since 
our sample does not include those who were self-employed at the time of the survey.
32Monthly values are averaged for each year, with 1991 as the base year.  Source:  Economic Trends, Annual Supple-
ment 1999, Office for National Statistics.
Appendix: 
The Data
British Household Panel Survey
Tenure is the total number of years the individual works for the same employer.  It is constructed for all indi-
viduals who are in paid employment.  It is not constructed for the self-employed, since they are excluded from the 
sample.  Individuals are asked to give the starting date of the job spell, and not the spell with the employer.30  For 
example, if the individual is promoted, the date collected is the date of promotion.  In order to track down the 
starting date with the present employer, we go back as many spells as there are job changes with the same employer, 
which in many instances involves using information from the inter-wave history files and the retrospective data.   
We add the time spent in the various spells with the same employer in order to compute tenure with the employer.   
When linking the job spell information in the various yearly questionnaires and the retrospective data collected in 
waves 2 and 3, one is confronted with the overlapping of two or more sources of information for the same spell, 
or part of it.  Conflicting answers are resolved by giving priority to the information collected closest to the event 
occurrence.  This is because recall error is likely to increase with the time elapsed between an event and the time 
of interview.  In addition, in some cases in two consecutive waves, although the job starting date given in the later 
wave falls before the previous wave interview, the discrepancy between the two start dates makes it clear that they 
refer to two different job spells.  We therefore also adopted the rule that if the starting date of a given spell occurs 
just before the previous wave interview date (that is, during the previous year) and it is more than 1 year removed 
from the starting date recorded in the previous interview, then this spell is assumed to have started just after the 
previous wave interview.
Experience sums the individual’s time spent in paid employment31 since leaving full-time education.  Similar to 
the tenure variable, it combines the information from the various yearly questionnaires and the retrospective data 
collected in waves 2 and 3.
The skill variable is constructed from the information on the individuals’ highest educational qualification.  We 
classified workers into three skill groups as follows.  Unskilled:  No qualifications, other qualifications, apprenticeship, 
CSE, commercial qualifications, no O levels.  Medium-skilled:  O levels or equivalent, nursing qualifications, teaching 
qualifications, A levels, other higher qualifications.  University graduates:  1st Degree, Higher degree.
The nominal hourly wage is obtained by first dividing the current job’s usual gross monthly pay by 4.33 to obtain 
the weekly wage and then dividing that result by weekly hours.  Weekly hours are the sum of the number of hours 
normally worked per week and the number of overtime hours in a normal week.  The nominal hourly wage is then 
deflated with the Retail Prices Index32 to obtain real hourly wages.
German Socio-Economic Panel
Tenure in the job was constructed as the period between the exact year and month the individual started the 
current job and the time of interview.  This variable was rounded to the nearest year.  Conflicts in the starting dates 
were resolved by giving priority to the information collected closest to the event occurrence.
The number of years of labor market experience is constructed in two stages.  In the first stage we use the yearly 
biographical scheme containing employment information from the age of 16 to the first wave of the panel to con-
struct total experience at entry into the panel.  Both part-time and full-time spells are taken into account.  In the 
second stage we use the calendar available for each wave listing all labor market activities for each month in the 
year preceding the interview.  This information is added to the information computed in the first stage to construct 
experience at each wave.  This variable was rounded to the nearest year.
Given the apprenticeship training system in Germany, for our skill variable we divided workers into three groups.   
Unskilled:  no apprenticeship training and no university degree.  Medium-skilled or apprenticeship trainees:  apprentice-
ship training.  University graduates:  university degree.  Workers who changed skill category were excluded.
The real hourly wage was constructed using the information on the reported gross earnings in the month preced-
ing the interview.  These excluded any payments by the employer that fell outside regular pay, such holiday money, 
back-pay, and overtime.  This amount was divided by 4.33 to obtain the weekly wage and then was divided by weekly 
hours.  Weekly hours are derived from the actual number of hours worked per week, based on responses given to 
the question, “And how much on average does your actual working week amount to, with possible overtime?”  Gross 
nominal hourly wages were deflated by the German consumer price index.392  INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
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